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Summary findings
Financial liberalization was expected to make interest  the greatest increase as liberalization progressed -
rates and asset prices more volatile, with distributional  shifting substantial rents from the public sector and from
consequences such as reduced or relocated rents and  favored borrowers.
increased competition in financial services. Honohan  Whereas quoted bank spreads in industrial countries
examines available data on money market and bank  contracted somewhat in the late 1990s, spreads in
interest rates for evidence of whether these things  developing countries remained much higher, presumably
happened.  reflecting both market power and the higher risks of
He shows that as more and more countries liberalized,  lending in the developing world.
the level and dynamic behavior of developing-country  There was no clear-cut change in mean rates of
interest rates converged to industrial-country norms. In  inflation, monetary depth, or GDP growth. If anything,
the short term, volatility increased in both real and  there was a small average improvement in inflation, but a
nominal money market interest rates. Treasury bill rates  decline in monetary depth and economic growth, relative
and bank spreads, evidently the most repressed, showed  to trends in industrial countries.
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The process of financial liberalization was expected to increase the volatility of interest
rates and asset prices, to have distributional consequences in the form of reduced or relocated
rents,  and to  have increased competition in the financial services industry.  In this paper we
examine the  available data  on money market  and bank  interest  rates for  evidence on these
propositions.
WVe  show that, as more and more countries liberalized, the level and dynamic behavior of
developing country interest rates converged to industrial country norms.  Liberalization did mean
an increased short-term volatility in both real and nominal money market interest rates.  Treasury
bill  rates and bank  spreads were  evidently the most repressed, and  they showed the greatest
increase as liberalization progressed: this  shifted substantial rents  from the public  sector and
from favored borrowers.  Whereas quoted bank spreads in industrial countries contracted again
somewhat  during  the  late  1990s, spreads  in  developing  countries  remained  much  higher,
presumably reflecting both market power and the higher risks of lending in the developing world.
Sections 1 and 2 review the global pattern of long-term and short-term dynamics in interest
rate  levels  and  spreads.  Section  3  proposes  an  approach  to  judging  when  the  de  facto
liberalizaLtion  of wholesale rates occurred, and Section 4 measures the speed of adjustment of
developing country interest rates to  external interest rate shocks before and after these dates.
Section 5 examines the way in vwhich  changes in wholesale rates passes through to bank lending
and deposit rates.  Using the date of de facto  wholesale interest rate liberalization,  Section 6
compares  overall  economic performance  before  and  after.  Section  7  contains  concluding
remarks.1.  Global trends in interest rate levels anfd  spreads (annual data)
1.1  Global trends since 1960
Broad trends in global interest rates since 1960 are summarized by the world medians
shown in Table 1  .2  There appears to have been a general upward trend in the level of world
median real interest rates, but the most striking feature is a pronounced secular swing in real rates
over the past forty years, with a sharp dip into negative rates in the 1970s followed by a recovery
to higher than previous levels in the 1980s and 1990s, and the beginnings of a reduction again
more recently. The swing is evident in both money market and deposit rates.
From a theoretical point of view, variations over time in the general level of unregulated
wholesale ex post  real interest rates can be  explained by deviations of actual from  expected
inflation,  and  because  of  cyclical  or  trend  changes  in  the  productivity  of  capital  and  the
propensity to save and perceptions of risk.  Changes in the degree to which these interest rates
are administratively controlled will also be a factor.
The causes of the secular swing in world interest rates since the  1960s, a we][l known
feature of industrial country data, have been debated in the literature at length. 3 Was there a
downturn in the marginal efficiency of capital (possibly associated with the surge in petroleum
and other primary product prices); or was there a transitory an increase in the propensity to save?
These are probably the leading explanations.  In a fully integrated world capital market, these
real factors would be fully transmitted across all markets, and would not retain  any national
features.  Nominal,  currency-specific factors such as shifts in the relation between actual and
expected  inflation  are  of  greater  interest  in  the  present  context,  where  we  are  looking  at
differences in the behavior of interest rates from country to country.  Thus, a fairly plausible and
2  In this section,  unless  otherwise  stated, "real"  rate dala shown  are computed  as ex post  real interest rates simply
adjusted  for consumer  price inflation,  see the data appendix.  In Table 1, for each year the median  is formed  from all
of the countries  for which  IFS data exists  for that  year.
3 An important  early analysis  of the episode  is Blanchard  and Summers  (1984). Bank of England  (1996)  presents  a
useful  overview  of empirical  work  explaining  long-trends  in real interest  rates in  the industrial  countries.
2parsimonious  (albeit  somewhat  underrated)  interpretation  attributes  part  of  the  U-shaped
evolution to a long lag in the formation of inflation expectations.  In this account the relatively
high  inflation of  the  1970s in  most  industrial  countries was unexpected and  its  persistence
continued to be underestimated for most of that decade. 4 Furthermore, even where the market
did revise its inflation expectations upwards, interest rate controls inhibited the response of some
markets to the expected inflation.  In contrast, although inflation began to come under control in
most industrial countries by the mid-1980s, by that time inflation expectations were high  and
remained stubbornly so, placing upward pressure on nominal market interest rates.  By that stage,
many  interest rate controls had  been dismantled, so that  actual rates more closely  reflected
market forces.  A subsequent decline in real rates by the mid-1990s is explained in this account
by the gradual decline in inflation expectations in recent years.  In addition to these effects of the
"great inflation" of the  1970s, the stance of countercyclical monetary policy has also  been a
factor.
The  degree  to  which  developing  country  rates have  tracked  the  long  swing  is  an
indication of the degree to which elements of global financial integration were already in effect
by 1960.
Table 1: Median World Real Interest Rates, 1960-95
Money market  Deposit rate  Lending
less deposit
1960  1.3  2.4  3.6
1965  -0.5  0.5  3.5
1970  -0.7  0.8  2.9
1975  -5.8  -3.5  3.5
1980  -6.1  0.0  3.7
1985  2.0  5.0  4.2
1990  0.4  5.1  5.5
1995  2.2  3.4  5.9
Note: In this table deflation  is by curTent  inflation,  i.e. these are ex ante real  rates  with stationary  expectations.
'  That is not to say  that inflation  was underestimated  in each quarter,  but investing  in inflation  hedges  was inhibited
by set-up costs,  as well as liquidity  and  other  risks,  the assumption  of which  could only  be justified by expectation
of sustained  inflation.
3The median quoted internediation  spread between deposit and lending rates remained
broadly  constant  during  1960-1980 but  has  risen  rather  sharply  since then.  A numlber of
interpretations are possible.  For one thing there could have been an increase in the market power
of banks, possibly associated with the relaxation of interest rate controls.  Another factor could
be the deterioration in loan-loss experience in the latter part of the sample: equilibriurm  spreads
should have widened to take account of the credit risk.  Finally, the degree to which the quoted
rates are representative will have varied over time, with large depositors and first-rate borrowers
beginning to have new non-bank opportunities.
1.2  The developing countries catch up: annual data from 1975
Data  for  the  early  years  in  Table  1 are  sparse:  the  early  years  included  vety  few
observations.  Only from about 1980 on is there data for at least several dozen countries in each
case.  Table 2 and Figures 1 to 4 provide more detail for the period since 1975, distinguiishing
between industrial and developing countries. These show mean and percentile figures in addition
to the median on an annual basis.  Along with rnoney market and treasury bill rates, we show
bank  deposit rates and the  quoted intermediation spread, i.e. the difference between  quoted
deposit  rates  and  quoted  lending  rates  for  as  many  countries  as  have  sufficient  annual
observations included in International Financial Statistics. 5 The general trend is summarized by
three-yearly averages of the medians shovn in Table 2.
Table 2: Median Ex-post Real World Interest Rates: 1970s to 1990s
Money  Market  Treasury  Bill  Deposit  Lending  less  deposit
%  Industrial  Developing  Industrial  Developing  Industrial  Developing  Industrial  Developing
1975-77  -1.0  -0.4  -0.9  -3.1  -2.8  -4.2  2.8  4.1
1980-82  3.3  1.6  2.4  -1.9  0.1  -2.3  4.1  4.6
1985-87  5.8  3.7  5.3  0.9  3.2  1.5  4.4  5.0
1990-92  6.7  6.8  6.2  2.5  3.3  2.5  5.1  6.7
1995-96  3.1  4.4  3.5  5.0  1.8  3.5  4.0  6.6
Note: The mean  of the median  across  countries  is shown. For  the spread  mean shown  is for 1995-97.
S These figures  and data are based on countries  for which annual  data is available  for at least 12 years within 1980-
93. It is not a balanced  pool:  the number  of countries  varies somewhat  from year to year,  but more according  to the
series, from a mean of 35 for money  market  and 36 for treasury  bill rates to 59 for intermediation  spreads and 62
for deposit  rates. This sample  selection  strategy  represents  a compromise  between  the desirability  of including  as
many countries  as possible  with  the risks  of too unbalanced  a pool. One potentially  important  but hidden source  of
sample-selection  bias could arise to the extent that reporting  of data to IFS is correlated  with a liberalized  interest
rate  regime.
4Figure 1  :Median  Ex-post Real World Interest Rates: 19 70s to 1990s
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This annual data reveals some similarities and some contrasts between developing and
industrial country interest rates,
Developing country real interest rates on an upward trend
The real interest rates shown begin at predominantly negative levels, with even the third
quartile generally negative or close to zero in the late 1970s. Developing country rates were, on
average,  even lower  than those  in  industrial  countries  up  to  the  mid-1980s;  but  thereafter
developing country rates increased and passed out the industrial  countries to  end  the period
5higher.  The reduction in industrial country rates from the mid-1990s was not  systematically
followed in the developing world
Market re-ranks different interest rates
Market forces  can be  expected to push deposit rates below, and  lending rates above,
wholesale money  market  rates, reflecting costs  and risks.  Assuming  that  quoted  interbank
money market  rates  .elate to  lending that  is highly  liquid and  virtually  free of  credit  risk,
Treasury bill rates at the same maturity should be very close to money market rates.  In the data,
median 6 deposit rates were generally lower than money market rates, but not always lower than
Treasury bill  rates.  Until the  1990s, Treasury bill rates fell  below  money  market  rates  in
developing countries, probably reflecting controls, taxes or other administrative requirements
(including compulsory take-up rules) more than a market assessment of differential risk. T he fact
that official (discount) rates switch from being lower than money market rates to being higher
may reflect changing mechanisms of central bankc  liquidity support to the market as more central
banks shifted away from a subsidized and rationed facility to a penalty rate facility as their main
off-market method of intervening.
International dispersion of real interest rates does notfall
Evidence on trends in the international dispersion of real interest rates is ambiguous.  All
standard measures of dispersion increase from the 1960s to the 1970s, though the small number
of countries included in the early years may affect this.  Subsequently the interquartile range and
the gap between top and bottom decile show no clear trend in any of the series, 7  but the standard
deviation and range increase, reflecting more extreme outliers. 8 This finding is, perhaps, slightly
surprising: had the data been drawn from countries with and without interest controls we might
have expected an  increase in dispersion in the 1980s when real interest rates increased in the
6Note  that in general  a different  country  will be the median  for each rate.
7 For example,  the estimated  LS time  trend for the interquartile  range of money  market  rates is -6.5 basis points  per
annum  - small  relative  to a mean range of 462 basis points  - with a standard  error of 3.3, not quite  significant  at
the 5 per cent level. The steepest  shrinkage  of interquartile  is for the deposit  rate, with  an estimated  annual  trends of
-12.6 basis points,  highly significant  with a standard  error of 4.3.  (Note  in contrast  that the interquartile  range for
the intermediation  spread  does show a statistically  significant  widening  over  time.)
Especially  negative  outliers  - in several  years  the distribution  across  countries  has a highly negative  skew.
6uncontrolled countries, followed by a narrowing as more and more countries decontrolled.  This
alerts us to the possibility that iinterest  rate controls may not have been fully effective in the early
years, at least for these countries.  Bear in mind, however, that the sample of countries may suffer
from selection bias to the extent that reporting of statistics to IFS may be correlated with degree
of regime liberalization.
Bank spreads increase
Bank  quoted gross intermediation spreads (as measured by  subtracting quoted deposit
from quoted lending rates) increase sharply with the general increase in rates during the 1980s. In
industrial countries the increase is from 2.8 per cent in the mid-1970s to 5.2 per cent in the early
1990s; in the developing countries the spreads are wider: increasing from 4.1 per cent to 6.7 per
cent.  During the 1  990s, these spreads remain high in developing countries, whereas they decline
in the industrial countries. 9 Except for one year, the median quoted rates for the developing
countries are higher than for the industrial countries.  The gap becomes quite wide by the late
1990s.  Once again, this result cannot be extrapolated to an increase in bank profitability for a
variety of reasons.  For one thing, the single rates used do not purport to be average rates, but
quoted rates for instruments of standard quality.  Furthermore, the risk profile of borrowers and
the extent to which quoted rates bundle the cost of other banking services to customers may have
changed systematically over time.
2.  Short-run dynamics of wholesale rates - overview
We have nearly  complete monthly  data since  1980 on wholesalel° interest  rates  and
inflation  for  some  28  significant"  developing  countries.  In  a  later  section  we  will  have
something to say about nominal rates, but here the focus is on rates adjusted for exchange rate
9  To what extent  this recent  reversal  in industrial  countries  reflects  disintermediation  from banking  is not clear: it is
widely believed  that industrial  country  banks  have lost some market  power  in the past decade,  which would  have
narrowecl  spreads. But although  it is their  most creditworthy  customers  that they have lost  to securities  markets,  the
shifting  composition  of their loan portfolio  towards  lower  quality  is unlikely  to influence  the quoted spreads,  which
are usually  for standard  borrower  categories.
0 We use  the term to imply  either  money  market  or treasury  bill  rates.
1 The number would be 43 before excluding  microstates  and multiple  members of currency  unions (see Data
Annex)
7change  and  expected inflation.  We  find that  both  forms of  adjusted exchange  rates  have
displayed extremes of high and low -both spikes and on a sustained basis.
2.1  Expected or ex ante real interest rates in developing countries
Our approximation for expected, or ex ante real exchange rates, is to subtract a smoothed
rate  of inflation (Hodrick-Prescott filter - see D)ata  Annex) from  actual nominal  rates.  This
simple procedure has the advantage of eliminating the volatile month-to-month noise  in the
inflation data. 12 Because of the high  smoothing parameter used, short-run changes in the real
interest series thus derived are largely attributable to interest rate changes rather than expected
inflation (and this is true of all spikes).
The  resulting  data  are plotted  in  Figure  5.  The  plots  are  characterized  by  gentle
fluctuations  with  a  period  of  a  few  years  punctuated  by  intervals  of  sometimes  violent
fluctuations on a month-to-month basis.' 3 So, in contrast to what is predicted by simple models
of market efficiency, rational expectations and static preferences, real interest rates in developing
countries have had  a considerable degree of persistence, as well being  subject to  short term
reversible shocks.
Developing  country  interest  rates  have  been  high  Some  of  these  countries  have
experienced extended periods of very high real interest rates.  Of the 17 treasury bill countries in
our data set, eight have had mean real interest rates in double digits continuously for at least three
years.  Guyana had the highest three-year mean real interest rate at over 26 per cent.  Much
higher real  interest rates  have been  sustained for periods  as  long as  one  year:  five  of the
countries had  one-year means of over 20 per cent: one (Sierra Leone) with  45 per  cent and
another (Mexico) with 33 per cent.
12 We  applied  a single  filter  to each  country's  entire  inflation  series,  rather  than  using  a Kalman  filter. A one-sided
backward-looking  univariate  filter  on this data  would  use too little  information  to provide  a credible  expectations
proxy,  especially  (but  not only)  for  early  periods. This  outweighs  the  obvious  drawback  of the  procedure  we have
adopted,  namely  that  the  expected  inflation  for  time  t is computed  using  data  that  was  not  available  at time  t.  While
that  would  make  this approximation  questionable  for exarnining  issues  of informational  efficiency,  those  issues  are
not  a central  focus  of this  paper (cf.  Baxter,  1996;  Edison  and  Pauls,  1993).
c,...  And  volatile  But  there have also been very  low real interest rate  observations in
developing  countries, and, despite a  low (negative) mean value, the mean  of 25  developing
country monthly standard deviations (excluding Argentina and Brazil) in our sample is 877 basis
points, compared with just 18  7 basis points for the eight control industrial countries.  And this is
not just due to some outliers: the smallest of developing country standard deviations is 221 basis
point fDr Singapore.
2.2  Negatively skewed distribution of $-adjusted rates
Volatility and extreme values are also evident in Table 3, which compares the  1980-97
average statistics of monthly wholesale returns for developing and industrial countries adjusted
for actual change in exchange rates against the US dollar.  Although the mean of developing
country $-adjusted money market rates was on average much lower than for industrial countries,
this mainly reflected the wider variation over time of exchange-rate adjusted interest rates for
developing countries, and  in particular the negative skewness (influence of  extreme negative
observations).  In other words, occasional sharp devaluations were not fully compensated-for by
a sufficient excess return or peso premia in developing country interest rates in normal times.
Table 3: Ex post $-adjusted Money Market Rates: Industrial and Developing Countries,
Monthly Data: 1980-97
% per annum  26 Developing Countries  12 Industrial Countries
mean over countries of:
mean (standard error)  0.49 (9.0)  7.34  (1.1)
median  3.04  7.56
maximum  107.3  86.2
minimum  -490  -94.9
standard deviation  53.3  28.9
skewness  -3.95  -0.1
median over countries of:
median  6.95  6.11
standard deviation  35.2  32.5
Note:  26 large developing countries not including Argentina or Brazil
13  Unit root tests can reject non-stationarity of at least half of the country series at the 5 per cent level, suggesting
that these apparent slow oscillations are not just an optical illusion.
93.  The timing of liberalization: wholesale rates
For the purpose of describing liberalization, we need at least to distinguish between three
main types of control: first, external capital (exchange) controls which drive a wedge between
domestic and foreign wholesale rates but need not involve any administrative control of domestic
rates.  Second, administrative control of domestic wholesale rates (this is unlikely to be very
effective in the absence of exchange controls).  Third, control of retail bank deposit and lending
rates. Note that even in a liberalized environment, the authorities can also influence 'wholesale
interest rates by use of monetary policy instruments, but such action is to be distinguished from
"control".
Because relaxation  of these three  controls is  rarely  simultaneous, it  is  not  normally
possible to define a single date on which liberalization occurred. Worse, multiplicity of different
interest rates in  any country and the varied array of  administrative controls" 4 that  have been
employed make it impossible in most cases to define a single liberalization date even for one of
the three types of control.  Besides, not infrequently, there have been partial reversals of prior
liberalizations." 5 Finally. all observers concur that the timing in practice of particular relaxations
often does not coincide with the fornal  relaxation: sometimes the control has become a dead
letter long  before formally removed; in  other instances formal control has been replaced  by
informal administrative suasion, or de facto  control exercised by the government through  its
ownership of dominant banks.
By the mid-1  990s the process of liberalization has proceeded in many countries to full or
almost full abolition of all three types of control; but the process has been a protracted one with
many stages varying in importance.  This clearly points to the need for detailed country-by-
" For example,  foreign exchange  controls  may be relaxed for certain classes  of investors;  or ceilings on capital
exports may be increased. Controls on treasury bill rates may be retained, along with compulsory  investment
requirements  from banks and other institutions,  while other wholesale  rates are freed. Controls on lending  rates
may be relaxed for certain  sectors  of borrowers,  or for certain  categories  of bank or near-bank. Controls  on bank
deposit  rates  may be relaxed  for certain  size categories,  or maturities,  or for accounts  attracting  a particular  class of
income  tax treatment.
1  0country  analysis." 6 But  it is  also  an  obstacle to  econometric estimation  of  the  impact of
liberalization on a cross-country basis, as knowledge of the timing is all but indispensable.
An alternative is  to try  to  infer the timing  of key  aspects of  liberalization  from the
statistical properties of the interest rate data themselves." 7 Two classic approaches to measuring
the degree of external capital account liberalization by the looking at interest rate and  other
macroeconomic time  series have been proposed by Edwards (1985) and  Edwards and  Khan
(1985), where interest rate data is available, and by Haque and Montiel (1991) where interest rate
data is not  available.  Each of these approaches assumes that the  effective interest rate  is a
weighted average  of that  which  would prevail  in  fully controlled and  uncontrolled  regimes
respectively; the estimated weiglht  then becomes an indicator variable representing the degree to
which the domestic money market is open and uncontrolled.  They could be adapted to allow
some tiime-variation in  the indicator, and hence in  principle to  identify a  liberalization  date.
While  both  approaches thus  offer  elegant solutions  to  the  problem  at hand,  they  have  the
important  shortcoming that  each assumes  that uncovered  interest parity  UIP  prevails  in  an
uncontrolled  market.  The  well-known  fact,  that  UIP  is  empirically  questionable  even  for
countries without any form of foreign exchange control, mars the use of this as an identifying
assumption.  There are also difficulties with the specification of equilibrium in the controlled
market.  Further commentary on these approaches, together with  some discussion of possible
alternatives, is included as Appendix 1.
A simpler approach that does not rely on UIP depends instead on the assumption that the
short-run dynamic behavior of interest rates changes with liberalization.
'5 Thus it is not surprising  to find,  for example,  that a recent study's  table presenting  just 27 liberalization  dates  had
to be accompanied  by two-and-a-half  pages  of qualifying  notes (Galbis,  1993).
16 As illustrated  by several contributions  to the present research (Cho, 1999; Montes-Negret  and Landa, 1999;
Wyplosz, 1999).
17 If an unregulated  curb market exists alongside  the formal market, and if interest rate data for the curb market
exist,  then differences  between  the rates can be used as a measure  of the degree to which the controls bite.  This
approach has been used for domestic  curb markets  by Reisen and Yeches (1993), and extensively  for off-shore
"euro"-markets,  cf. Wyplosz  (1999).
11A  For administratively controlled interest rates this assumption seems readily acceptable.  If
rates that were held absolutely constant for extended periods are suddenly found to change from
month to month, there has to be a presumption i;hat  controls have been relaxed.  We find below
that  simple  filters designed to  detect shifts of this  type from administratively  fixed rates to
variable  identify  plausible  regime  shift  dates  for  many  developing  country  bank  nominal
wholesale rates.
B  Where rates  are market-determined bul: behind  effective exchange  controls, they  are
exposed to  fluctuations in money supply, but  may be  partly insulated  from the pressures of
speculation related to  changing exchange rate expectations.  (A simple model is discussed in
Appendix 1).  If the second form of disturbance is likely to be higher than the first, liberalization
of  capital controls will be  marked by  an increase  in  short-run interest  rate  volatility.  This
assumption  is  necessarily  controversial.  However,  a  sharp  increase  in  short-run  wholesale
interest rate volatility during the period known to be one of liberalization may then indicate a
critical effective date of liberalization.  We will see below that a  filter of this  type based on
recursive  residuals  of  a  simple  dynamic  model  of  wholesale  interest  rate  unambiguously
identifies regime shift dates for many developing countries, plausibly marking significant shifts
towards elimination of capital controls.
Regime shift of type A:  Relaxation of nominal rate controls
Figure 6 shows changes in nominal money market rates.  Several countries begin the
period with  a  pattem  of occasional non-zero changes only, and  then make  a  transition  into
frequent  changes.  To  identify  key  dates  for  relaxation  (or  reimposition)  of  fixed  rate
administrative control we applied a filter whic]h  triggers "control off'  whenever the number of
changes in the following seven months is four or more, and subsequently triggers "control on" if
there  is  a  period of  more than  12 months  without  any  change.  "Control  off'  periods  are
identified as such in Table 4.
12Regime shift of type B:  Marked increases in real interest volatility
In  order  to  identify  shifts of this  type, we  estimated an econometric  model  of  each
country's ex ante real interest rate and looked for large forecast errors.  Specifically, we fitted a
simple error-correction model for each country's real interest rate,  assuming that it  could be
modeled as a function of changes in the world interest rate,' 8 of the gap between the world and
the local interest rate, and by some autoregressive dynamics.' 9 The estimates were by recursive
least squares, and we tested the fitted equations for break-points indicated by systematic failure
of one-month ahead recursive forecasts. 20 Examples of the procedure are shown in Figures 7 (a)
and (b) for India and Kenya.  The recursive residuals from the dynamic interest rate model are
shown, bracketed by 5 per cent confidence intervals.  In the lower panel is plotted the probability
level at which the hypothesis of no structural change can be rejected in each period.  For the
Indian data, March 1990 is identified as the break point, and for Kenya, March 1993.  Plots for
all the countries, together with details of the estimated regressions on the full period, and on the
before- and after-liberalization sub-periods are provided in Appendix 2.  Note that this method
cannot detect a gradual increase in volatility.
As the method identifies regime change events with short-term increases in volatility, the
subsequent  finding that  volatility  remained high  after the  change  is  not  an  inevitable  and
tautological consequence of the identification method, but represents an independent observation.
(Indeed, to verify this, we also computed post-event volatility removing a six-month window
after the event.)
1  We used  the first principal  component  of the 8 large industrial  country  real  TB rates  as a proxy for the world rate.
'9  The model  employed  is equivalent  to that of equation  (1') in the next section  below,  with  k1.
20 The criterion  for a break  was three forecast  errors  in four consecutive  months  each statistically  significant  at least
the 1  per cent level. (A single data outlier  in the level of interest  rates could have triggered  a break if the criterion
had required  only two  significant  forecast  errors).
13Figure 7: Recursive residuals from dyinamic  model of real interest change
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Repeating the exercise for all of the coumtries we found a plausible pattern  of breaks
(Table 4).  For 15 of the 17 developing country TB rates, there was a single break during the
sample period 21. Following the break, the residual standard error was much higher - the imedian
ratio of the before and after residual standard errors was 4.3.22 Thus we find not only an episode
of increased volatility as estimated by the recursive prediction failure, but also that subsequent
volatility is higher on a sustained basis.
The filter flags sudden increases in volatLility,  but, based as it is on recursive (backward-
looking) regressions, it does not imply a sustained increase in volatility after the liberalization
date. Our finding that volatility did stay high after the liberalization date does therefore represent
an independent finding.
21 Two breaks for Trinidad & Tobago.
22  The calculation was also made after deleting six obsenrations at the break in order to verify that the increase in
variance was peristent and not solely driven by a few months around the date of the break.
14The  coefficients  oif the  error-correction  process  are  not  all  well-determined,  but
sometimes there is also an indication of a stronger impact of world interest rates after the break.
All iin  all, it the empirical patterns detected seem to confirm the a priori belief that this method
would capture a significant date in the liberalization of wholesale interest rates. 23
The same approach was extended to  8 of the  10 money market rates  (Argentina and
Brazil excluded because of the difficulty of defining a satisfactory smoothed inflation series).
Here a further three break points were detected as shown in Table 4, again with high volatility
ratios.  The  indications  were  that  most  of  the  remaining  countries  may have  crossed  that
threshold before 1980.24
Also included in Table 4 are the liberalization dates provided for these countries by other
recent  studies. 25 The  differences  between  the  dates  reflect  differences  in  the  concept  of
liberalization date being used.  They should thus be considered as complementary to the dates
obtained bv approaches (a) and (b) here.  Galbis (1993) study uses dates at which preferential
lendiing rates, or controls on key bank deposit or lending rates were removed.  Demirguic-Kunt
and Detragiache (1998) use deregulation of bank interest rates as the observable policy change
to  date  liberalization.  Williamson  and  Mahar  (1998)  are  looking  at  a  wider  concept  of
financial liberalization and provide two dates:  'start of liberalization'  and 'largely  liberalized'.
23 We also carried  out the same  exercise  for the thirteen  industrial  countries. Break points  within  the sample  period
were also found  for four of these. (An unusual  situation  arose for one country,  Ireland,  where a break existed,  but
the post-break  residual variance was lower than the pre-break. In fact the identified break was in this instance
related  to the EMS  crisis of 1992-93  rather  than  to liberalization.)
24 Liberalization  is not irreversible;  the data from Malaysia  (late 1981),  and  to a lessor  extent India  (early 1984)  and
Pakistan  (late 1985)  provides  some indications  of a reversal  to a narrower  range of fluctuation.
25 Appendix  Table  A gives  the dates  from these  studies  for additional  developing  countries.
15Table  4:  Date of de facto  liberalization  of wholesale  interest  rates
Approach:  "Control  off"  Marked  volatility  Expert  datings
increase  1980-97
Volatility  Galbis  D&D  W&M
Date A  Date B  ratio  Start  Largely
60C Treasury  Bill
Fiji  82:08  85:06  4.7
Ghana  84:08-84:11;  91:10  2.1
87:10
Guyana  87:03-88:07;  89:10  5.5  91
89:10
Jamaica  80:08  91:03  4.3  85:10  91
Kenya  pre-80  93:03  4.2  91
Sri Lanka  85:09  88:03  1L.6  80  78  -
Mexico  pre-80  83:11  2.6  85:03  89  74; 89  92
Malawi  92:06  92:06  5.3
Nepal  89:08  89:10  32.5  86:05  89  -
Philippines  pre-80  84:06  3.8  82:12  81  81  94
Papua New Guinea  80:07  86:01  1.1  pre-80
Swaziland  82:12  None
Trinidad and Tobago  80:02  84:07;  6.7
94:11
Sierra Leone  91:12  87:08  4.9
Uganda  92:03  81:10  135.0  88:07
South Africa  pre-80  None  80  84
Zimbabwe  pre-80  92:04  2.4
60B  Money  market
India  pre-80  90:03  4.6  91  92  -
Korea  pre-80  None  Not lib  84-88; 91  83  --
Malaysia  pre-80  None  78:10  pre-80  78  92
Pakistan  pre-80-86:12;  92:03  3.7
89:12
Singapore  pre-80  None  78  73
Thailand  pre-80  90:03  2.1  90:03  89  mid-80s  92
Cote d'Ivoire  82:07-90:05  None  89:10
Mauritius  85:02  None  81:11
Industrial  countries
Australia  pre-80  82:02  2.3  81
New Zealand  85:02  83:08  7.9  pre-80; 84
Spain  84:01  83:01  21.3  87:03
Portugal  83:01  82:06  90.5  94
Notes:  Industrial countries included are those for which regime changes (b) were identified post 1980.
Volatility ratio  is the ratio  of the  standard error  of  estimate of dynamic  regression model  in the post-
liberalization period to that in the pre-liberalization period.
Dates  from  other  studies:  Galbis  (1993);  D&D=Demirguc-Kunt  and  Detragiache  (1998);  W&M:
Williamson and Mahar (1998) - showing start of liberalization and 'largely liberalized' dates.
164  Convergence of inlterest  rates
What does liberalization mean for global integration of world financial markets?  Some
indication can be found by modelling the dynamic behavior of real interest rates.  We arrive at
two main conclusions.
First, real  ex ante wholesale interest rates in  developing countries are  quite  strongly
influenced by  world  real interest  rate  movements.  Furthermore, if  we distinguish  between
before- and after- the liberalization events (type B)  reported in Table 4,26  we find that the impact
of world interest rates and the speed of convergence both increase following liberalization.
Second,  nominal  wholesale  interest  rates  help  predict  subsequent  exchange  rate
movements to a larger extent than is the case in the industrial countries.  Following liberalization,
their predictive power is no better than before.
The textbook  model  of  an efficient and  frictionless expectations-driven financial market
without risk aversion (ancl with sufficient goods-market integration to ensure purchasing-power
parity) implies that real interest rates will be equalized across countries and that nominal interest
rates differentials will represent unbiased predictions  of inflation and  exchange rate  change.
Imperfectly integrated and partially efficient financial markets will still tend to be influenced by
world interest rates and by expectations, though perhaps partially and with a lag.  This  section
provides a quantification cif  the imperfection, and how it evolves with liberalization.
4.1  Dynamic error-correction model
For our real ex ante wholesale interest rates, we estimated a dynamic error-correction model
in which the change in the interest rate is influenced by current world interest rates changes, and
by the lagged gap between domestic and world (real) interest rates, together, perhaps with the
lagged dependent variable.
26 In respect  of the countries  for which  no liberalization  events  of type  B are detected,  we treat the wholesale  rates  as
liberalized  throughout  the sample
17Thus, if the real world interest rate at time  t is denoted rtw and the real interest rate for
country i is denoted rti then the convergence model can be written:
Ar,'i  = a, +  bA,v  +  c,  (r,w  --  r,'.  I) + dAr,'  l + u,.
(1)
or,
Ar,i  ai + biAr,'  + ci ('rrw  - r,'.  I) + u,.
(1')
with  (in 1') u,  = ,=,  p,t-i  + Et
Here the coefficient ai indicates an average deviation between country i's real interest rate
and that of the "world", bi measures the impact effect of a change in world interest rates on those
in  i and  the  "catch-up effect" ci  indicates the  speed  with  which  deviations  from  the  mean
relationship with the world interest rate are closed..  Provided d<1 (or that the autoregressive
dynamics  of the  residual  are stable), a  positive value  of  ci implies  that  the  impact  of any
transitory shock Ar,'  or Et on ri is eventually completely damped. 27 would The coefficient <i,  or
the autocorrelation coefficient p capture the remainder of the dynamics.  (Equation (1') is also the
model used in Approach (b) above to identify a liberalization date.)
For a country whose financial system has not been liberalized and  integrated into the
world economy, one would expect smaller values of b and c, together with possibly larger values
of a.  (Indeed, if the domestic financial system was not at all linked to the rest of the world, even
indirectly, the coefficients b and c would be zero.)
Pooled cross section-time series estimation was employed.  Although the restriction that
coefficients were the same across countries (i.e. for all i) could be statistically rejected, it was
discovered that the rejection was at lower levels of significance if the autoregressive coefficients
were unrestricted, while the impact of world rates was restricted.  The point estimates obtained
from such a model indicate that, even before the identified dates of liberalization, world interest
27 Note that a statistical test here requires cointegration techniiques, on which a large literature exists, cf.  Wu and
Zhang (1996), O'Connell (1998).
18rates did have an impact on  developing countries.  The point estimate of the catch-up term is
estimated to be twice as high after liberalization than before.  Table 5 provides a representative
selection of estimates. 28
The typical speed of adjustment of these developing country interest rates to a shock in
world  interest  rates  is  also  estimated to  be  faster  after  liberalization.  Assuming  common
dynamics, but allowing different responses before and after liberalization (as in Regression C of
Table 5) results in a pattern as shown in the left hand panel29 of Figure 8 for a 500 basis point
rise.  While  the  impact  effect  in  the  first  few  quarters is  much  different,  the  subsequent
adjustment to the new equilibrium is slow in both (though the precision of the estimate of long-
term adjustment is naturally weak).  Inclusion of long (18 month) autoregressive disturbance
dynamics (right hand panel. of Figure 8, based on the Regression E of Table 5) accentuates the
difference between before  and  after.  (The figures  show point  estimates; 95%  confidence
intervals do overlap).
Figure 8: Speed  of adjustment  of developing  country  real interest  rates before  and after liberalization.
Regression C: Common  dynamics  Regression  E: Country-specific  dynamics
Typical  speed  of  adjustment  Typical  speed  of adjustment
Real  interest  rates  Real  interest  rates
12.5  16
lev 11.5  _e,-re  lev 164e  - els  1-  Before els  1  41  Before
e1s 5 k  :'  ,, After  .. After
0  12  0  12  24
Months  Months
2S Accepted  zero restrictions  on common  parameters  are imposed. Although  the restriction  that country  coefficients
are common  is not accepted,  we report country-specific  coefficients  only for the variable that gives the largest
increase  in log-likelihood.
29 Using  point estimates.
194.2  Interest differentials as predictors of exchange rate change.
A topic of extensive previous research for industrial countries is  the degree to  which
uncovered interest parity prevails.  Most research shown that it does not, 30 using some variant of
a regression of the exchange rate change (Ae) on interest differentials, i.e.:
Ae,,, = f  +g(r,  -r,  )+u,
(3)
and finding that the interceptf is nonzero and the slope g not unity.
Although subtle econometric issues arise, a simple pooled regression on monthly data for
twelve industrial countries in our sample (differentials against the US dollar) is not out of line
with standard findings:  The estimated intercept at 3.4 per cent is significantly different from
zero, the estimated slope is -0.21 (wrong sign) and significantly different from plus unity.  (Also
the autoregressive parameter is significantly different from zero, contrary to the uncovered parity
and rational expectations hypothesis).. The same pooled regression for 25 developing countries
has an even larger intercept, but now the slope is positive at 0.59, though it is still significantly
different from unity.  (Table 6).
Because of the empirical failure of this theory for industrial countries, and the absence of
an accepted theory to explain this, 31 it would be unwise to draw strong conclusions from the fact
that developing country interest rates are correlated with subsequent exchange rate movements.
A  plausible  interpretation is  that  future exchange  rate  change  in  high  inflation  developing
30 But weaker  tests of the theory  can hold: deviations  from U][P  are generally  found  to be stationary  and may have
mean insignificantly  different  from zero. See Tanner  (1998),  wvhose  decomposition  of UfP deviations  highlights  the
relatively  more important  role in developing  countries  of inflation  and real interest rate fluctuations. However,  in
our data (which  excludes  Argentina  and Brazil),  a zero global mean of UIP deviations  is strongly  rejected (i.e. in
the cross-section  time-series  pool).
31 Most of the explanations  advanced  invoke  some form of expectations  formation  error or lag, perhaps combined
with  an activist  monetary  policy  which  makes  the interest  differential  endogenous. (Froot  and  Frankel, 1990,  Evans
and Lewis, 1991; Kaminsky 1993;  McCallum,  1994). There are also acute small sample econometric  problems
(Marshall  et al, 1997).
20countries contains a more predictable component which is absent from exchange rate change in
the industrial countries over this time period. 32
Interestingly, the inclusion of post-liberalization dummies did not improve the fit of these
interest parity regressions.
Levine  (1991)  found  for  five  industrial  countries that  forecast  changes  in  the  real
exchange  rate  (Aq = Ae,,, -;  + ;r,),  were  also  a  best  forecast  of  deviations
(uip =  e,+ - r,' +rus) from UIP, pointing to an dominant role of anticipated real exchange rate
fluctuations in causing the failure of UIP.  This result does not appear to carry over to the pool of
developing countries.  Although forecast values of Aq do help forecast uip, these forecasts can be
improved upon.
32 This  meshes  with  the finding  of Mishkin  (1992)  that  the Fisher  effect  applies  only  where  there is a stochastic  trend
inflation
21Table 5: Estimate of dynamic model of wholesale interest rate convergence - Equations (1), (19
A Constrained  B  Country-  C Effect of  D Common  D'Liberalization  E Country-specific
specific dynamics  Liberalization  dynamics  changes dynamics  autocorrelation
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
a  0.079  (8.3)  0.042  (6.1)  0.046  (6.5)  0.040  (3.3)  0.044  (5.9)  0.054  (3.9)
b  0.135  (3.3)  0.071  (3.0)  -0.014  (5.4)
c  0.017  (10.4)  0.011  (9.0)  0.008  (5.5)  0.009  (4.6)  0.007  (5.0)  0.010  (3.9)
d  0.320  (24.6)  country  country  0.683  (28.5)  0.759  (17.1)
dum *a  0.063  (3.5)  0.141  (5.4)
dum*b  0.102  (2.9)  0.148  (2.8)  0.093  (2.5)  0.077  (3.1)
dum*c  0.009  (4.1)  0.011  (3.8)  0.008  (3.7)  0.035  (5.8)
dum*d  -0.449  (16.5)  -0.207  (6.5)  -0.211  (6.2)
Sample  26 developing  26 developing  26 developing  26 developing  26 developing  26 developing
80:03-96:12  80:03-96:12  80:03-96:12  80:03-96:12  80:03-96:12  80:03-96:12
Method  SUR  SUR  SUR  SUR  SUR  SUR; 18' order auto
RSQ/DW  0.097  2.06  0.157  2.02  0.161  2.03  0.103  2.03  0.164  2.03  0.332  1.98
Note:  'Country' means country-specific coefficients estimated (not reported);
Method:  SUR is Seemingly unrelated regressions system estimate of pool coefficients; 'auto'=autocorrelation.Table 6:  Uncovered Interest Parity
Dependent variable: log-change in US$ exchange rate- Equation 3
A Industrial  B Developing
Countries  Countries
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
f  3.43  (3.2)  9.96  (6.1)
g  -0.22  (1.1)  0.59  (5.9)
p  0.34  (18.5)  0.20  (3.0)
Sample  12 industrial  25 developing
80:01-97:12  80:01-97:12
Method  Pooled LS  Pooled LS
RSQ/DW  0.097  2.06  0.157  2.02
Note:  St. Lucia omitted: no variation in e.
The models of Edwards  and Khan and  Haque  and Montiel,  discussed earlier  and  in
Appendix 1, rely on the idea that the domestic interest rate is a weighted average of the rate that
would prevail if UIP was valid and a rate determined by domestic considerations.  Refining that
idea, as suggested in Appendix 1, we calculated the predicted exchange rate change on the basis
of available  data  for each  country for each data,  and use that  prediction as  an  explanatory
variable in a regression of the interest rate.  The domestic explanatory variables should not enter
separately in the equation.  'Interestingly,  we found that the coefficient on the predicted exchange
rate  change was  insignificantly different from  zero for pre-liberalization periods,  but  highly
significant, and with a coefficient  of about 0.37 for post-liberalization. However, though free of
some other problems that arise with that literature, this approach has the drawback of relying on
the UIP framework.
5.  Dynamic behavior of bank rates and intermediation spreads
Severely repressed financial systems often display inversions of interest rate structures,
with bank  lending rates, at least for some categories of borrower, being controlled below the
wholesale rates that might otherwise be considered as representing the marginal cost of funds.
This is not the case in the countries with sub-annual data which we have been considering in the
previous sections.  Instead, we find that bank interest rates in these countries do respond  to
movements in wholesale rates quite quickly.  Typically, deposit rates respond first,  with the
23result that an increase in rates widens intermnediation  spreads at first.  Spreads then narrow, as
lending rates gradually adjust, but the catch-up in estimated to be incomplete, so that a positive
long-tern  equilibrium relationship is estimated to exist between intermediation spreads and the
level of interest rates.
Here again  our main approach was to  use a  simple error-correction formulation in  a
pooled cross-section and time series.  As indicated in the appendix there are more countries for
which sufficient bank rate data exist than is the case for wholesale rates. An error-correction
model explaining movements in lending rates by those in deposit rates in 32 countries estimated
on quarterly data  1980-97 suggests a rapid pass-through: over  81 per  cent of  any change in
deposit rates being picked-up in lending rates in the same quarter, and over 93 per cent by the
second quarter. However, such a relationship can hardly be considered causal, as both bank rates
are likely to be influenced by the same exogenous factors.
Instead, therefore we modeled the determination of both  deposit and  lending rates as
being jointly influenced by wholesale rates, using the model:
j  m  c'r'-i  +'(  - -r'_1±)+  U'
Ar,' =a'  +E.=  b'Arm  +c(rl  r,Ml)+d(rP,
(2)
ArfP =aP  +  k  tb  PAr,j+1 +Pc(r/P, - r,rn)+d'(r_',  -rP  )++u P
(2')
where superscripts 1,  m, and p denote deposit, wholesale and lending rates respectively.  (Country
identifier has been suppressed.)
24Table 7:  Estimate of dynamic model of bank interest rate convergence - Equations (2), (29, (3)
A Deposit  rate  B Deposit  rate  C Deposit  rate (2)  D Lending  rate  E Lending-Deposit
Developing  (2)  Industrial  (2)  Country dynamics  Developing  (2)  Spread (3)
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
a  0.018  (0.5)  -0.081  (2.9)  -0.044  (1.9)  0.254  (5.5)  country
bl  0.361  (30.7)  0.402  (33.3)  country  0.361  (29.2)  0.0318  (6.2)
b2  0.140  (10.4)  0.086  (7.4)  0.079  (9.7)  0.104  (8.0)  country
b3  0.027  (24.6)  0.037  (3.3)  0.019  (2.5)  0.028  (2.2)
c  -0.006  (1.0)  -0l.010  (1.7)  0.002  (0.4)  -0.033  (3.5)  0.095  (10.1)
d  -0.042  (4.6)  -0.049  (6.5)  -0.031  (4.3)  -0.013  (1.6)  0.216  (12.8)
Sample  21 developing  19 industrial  21 developing  21 developing  21 developing
80:Q4-98:Q2  80:Q4-98:Q2  80:Q4-98:Q2  80:Q4-98:Q2  80:Q2-98:Q2
Method  SUR  SlJR  SUR  SUR  SUR - AR(1) spec
RSQ/DW  0.530  1.96  0.451  2.09  0.660  1.84  0.481  2.03  0.241  1.96
Note: Dependent  variables  are first differences  in the interest  rates and spread  as indicated;
'Country'  means  country-specific  coefficients  estimated  (not reported  except  for Regression  C - Table  8);
Method: SUR is Seemingly  unrelated  regressions  system  estimate  of pool  coefficients;
'AR(I) spec'  means  country  specific  first  order  autocorrelation  coefficient  estimated.
Table  7a:  Estimate of dynamic model of bank interest rate convergence - Equations (2), (29, (3)
A Deposit  rate  C Deposit  rate (2)  D Lending  rate  E Lending-Deposit
Developing  (2)  Country dynamics  Developing  (2)  Spread (3)
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
a  -0.069  (1.7)  -0.078  (3.0)  0.109  (3.1)  country
bl  0.504  (16.3)  country  0.246  (9.5)  0.024  (2.8)
b2 0.040  (1.2)  0.045  (2.1)  0.036  (1.3)  country
b3  0.034  (1.0)  0.003  (0.1)  0.068  (2.4)
c  0.007  (1.0)  -0.024  (2.0)  0.088  (6.6)
d  -0.056  (3.8)  -0.068  (5.3)  0.011  (1.1)  0.216  (10.7)
dum*a  0.094  (1.3)  0.031  (0.1)  0.298  (4.0)  0.578  (3.1)
dum*bl  -0.154  (4.7)  -0.063  (2.0)  0.144  (5.0)  0.099  (2.9)
dum*b2  0.111  (3.1)  0.028  (1.2)  0.061  (2.0)
dum*b3  -0.012  (0.3)  0.040  (1.7)  -0.052  (1.7)  -0.0001  (0.0)
dum *c  -0.023  (1.8)  -0.004  (0.2)  0.004  (0.2)
dum*d  0.010  (0.5)  0.042  (2.9)  -0.056  (3.5)  0.050  (2.6)
Sample  21 developing  21 developing  21 developing  21 developing
80:Q4-98:Q2  80:Q4-98:Q2  80:Q4-98:Q2  80:Q2-98:Q2
Method  SUR  SUR  SUR  SUR-AR(1)  spec
RSQ/DW  0.530  1.96  0.780  1.98  0.489  2.01  0.252  2.00
Note:  Dependent  variables  are first  differences  in the interest  rates and spread  as indicated;
'Country'  means country-specific  coefficients  estimated;
Method: SUR  is Seemingly  unrelated  regressions  system  estimate  of pool coefficients;
'AR(1)  spec'  means  country  specific  first  order  autocorrelation  coefficient  estimated.
25Estimating  these  equations in  a  pooled  cross-section and  time  series  with  21  developing
countries and  19 industrial countries shows that the speed of adjustment is quite similar for deposit
rates as between developing and industrial countries (Regressions A and B of Table 7).  Relaxation of
the constraint that the catch-up coefficient cl  is the same for all of the developing countries provides a
very  substantial  improvement in fit.  (Regression C  of Table 7).  The estimated  contemporaneous
response of the deposit interest rate to wholesale rates from this equation varies widely from between
about 75 and 85 per cent for Guyana and four African countries (Mauritius, Morocco, Uganda and
Zimbabwe) to only 4 per cent for Fiji  (Table 8), suggesting a ranking of the degree to which these
countries have a competitive and unrestricted banking market.
Table 8:  Estimated Catch-up Term (from Regression C of Table 7)
cl  (t-statistic)  cl  (t-statistic)
Fiji  0.041  (2.9)  Philipipines  0.527 (14.0)
Sri Lanka  0.082  (6.2)  St. Lucia  0.551  (0.6)
Indonesia  0.124  (3.5)  PapuaNG  0.552 (10.6)
Gote  d'Ivoire  0.181  (3.0)  South  Africa  0.618 (10.6)
Sierra  Leone  0.191  (3.6)  Zimbabwe  0.745 (11.9)
Trinidad  0.264  (1.6)  Mauritius  0.760  (8.2)
Korea  0.374  (5.7)  Ugan(da  0.775 (12.8)
Malawi  0.452  (7.5)  Swaziland  0.788  (9.5)
Zambia  0.458 (20.1)  Morocco  0.800 (16.1)
Jamaica  0.492 (11.6)  Guyana  0.863 (23.4)
Singapore  0.506 (10.4)
Adjustment of the lending rate p  follows a somewhat similar pattern, though it appears that
gradual adjustment to  any  deviation from the mean gap that  has  opened up  between  deposit and
lending rates takes place through adjustment in the lend-ing  rate rather than the deposit rate.  Thus the
deposit rate can be seen as a faster-adjusting variable than the lending rate (Regression D of Table 7).
The impact  of liberalization  is  indicated by  thle second panel  of  Table  7, which  cointains
estimates  in  which  the  parameters  are  allowed  to  shift  with  the  liberalization  (dates  as  before,
augmented by the Appendix Table where necessary).  Although the parameter values change, thLere  is
little overall impact on the speed of adjustment, as illustrated in Figure 9 (based on Regressions A of
Table 7).
26Figure 9: Speed of adjustment ofdeveloping  country deposit interest rates before and after liberalization.
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Dynamics  of the spread
The dynamic pattern of movements in the intermediation spread is summarized by a  similar
error-correction equation, with the change in the spread as dependent variable:
A,P  - Ar,' = as + bsr, m +  +bsA  cs (rP  - r  ) + ds (r-  rP ) + +
(3)
(Regression E of Table 7). This reveals that the spread does widen in response to an increase in money
market rates, converging gradually to an equilibrium relationship, and that the equilibrium spread is
positively related to the general level of interest rates, as indicated by the significant coefficient on the
lagged wholesale rate  (equivalent results  are obtained  when the deposit rate  is substituted  for the
wholesale rate).  Inclusion of liberalization dummies suggests that the long-term equilibrium relation
between spread and level of rates is primarily a post-liberalization phenomenon.
276.  Economic Performance Before and After Lib(eralization
How did aggregate economic performance change following liberalization?  Of course a full
causal analysis of the impact of liberalization goes well beyond the before and after experiment, and
requires controlling for many other factors.  Nevertheless, it is worth reporting the results of a simple
before-and-after comparison, using the dates from Approach (b) above.  The comparion does not reveal
a clearcut change in mean rates of inflation, monetary depth or GDP growth.  If anything there is a
small  average  improvement in  inflation, but  a  disirnprovement in  monetary  depth  and  economic
growth, relative to industrial country trends.  Table 9 shows mean pre- and post-liberalization mean
values of these variables for the set of countries for which liberalization dates for the Treasury Bill rate
have been identified above.  The data are also shown normalized as the difference between the subject
countries and the mean for seven large industrial countries taken as a control group.  Inflation-much
higher than in the control group fell somewhat more after liberalization, but the difference of  1.4 per
cent is not  statistically significant.  The modest increase in monetary depth (liquidity ratio and  in
annual GNP growth is in both cases less than occurred simultaneously in the control group,  though
again the difference is insignificant.
Table 9: Macroeconomic performance before and after interest liberalization
Before  After  Before  After  Difference  Better
?
Liberalization  (relative control  (t-stat)
group)
Inflation  (CPI  growth  %)  27.7  21.8  +19.9  +18.5  -1.4  (0.2)  Yes
Liqudity  ratio (M2/GDP  %)  35.3  37.0  -23.9  -27.2  -3.4  (0.5)  No
GNP growth  (%)  2.3  2.6  +0.6  +0.2  -0.4  (0.6)  No
Note: Source:  International  Financial  Statistics. Annual  data l975-97. The liquidity  ratio takes  the ratio of end-year  M2
to the mean GDP of same and following  year.  19 liberalizing  coimtries  including  Portugal  as in Table 1. Control  group:
US,  UK, Germany,  Italy, Sweden,  Switzerland  and Canada. Date  of liberalization  is that method  B above.
The increase in  interest rates and their volatility have not  been the only  factor influencing
economic development over the past two decades.  Fuwthermore,  financial liberalization has normally
been a complex, long-drawn out, and sometimes reversed process.  It would be surprising if a before
and after comparison based on our single date (method JR)  were to show a significant impact. 33
287.  Concluding remarks
Even an analysis confined to the countries for which data is available provides unmistakable
evidence for an increase in the general level of real interest rates as financial liberalization progressed,
and that this increase was more pronounced than the contemporaneous increase in industrial country
rates.  The volatility in wholesale rates also jumped in most liberalizing countries, the regime change in
this respect often being quite rnarked.
Though  evidence of  am increase  in  global  integration of  interest  rates  ia  also  noted,  the
indications here are more muted than might have been expected, probably reflecting the  fact that
pressures of globalization often persisted through  the pre-liberalization period,  and were  certainly
present before 1980.
As well as the implicit redistributions associated with changes in the level of wholesale rates,
changes in the relative position of different interest rates also have had a distributional effect, as well as
an  effect on incentives.  The increase in Treasury bill rates closer to other wholesale rates  is one
important aspect here, as is the widening of bank interest spreads, and the tendency for such spreads to
be con-elated  in the long-run with the level of wholesale rates.
3  The econometrics of these issues are addressed in the context of financial development and growth by King and Levine
(1993a,b), Levine, Loayza and BecL (1998), cf. Nausser and Kugler (1998).
29Appendix Table: Liberalization dates
(as reported in various studies)
Method:  Statistical (wholesale rates)  Expert datings
"Control off'  Volatility  Galbis  D&D  W&M
(a)
increase  Start  Largel
(b)  y
Argentina  77:06  77; 87  82; 93
Australia  pre-80  82:02  81
Bangladesh  89  -
Bolivia  85:08
Brazil  75:03  89  -
Cameroon  90:10
Chile  75:04  pre-80  74  85
Colombia  80:01  pre-80  80  95
Costa Rica  86:08
Cote d'Ivoire  82:07-90:05  - 89:10
Ecuador  86-87; 92
Egypt  91  91  -
El Salvador  91
Fiji  82:08  85:06
Ghana  84:08-84:11;  91:10
87:10
Guatemala  89
Guyana  87:03-88:07;  89:10  91
89:10
Honduras  90
Hong Kong  78  73
Hungary  91:01
India  pre-80  90:03  91  92  -
Indonesia  83  83  89
Israel  90  87  91
Jamaica  80:08  91:03  85:10  91
Jordan  88
Kenya  pre-80  93:03  91
Korea  pre-80  - Not litb  84-88;  91  83  -
Malawi  92:06  92:06
Malaysia  pre-80  - 78:10  pre-80  78  92
Mauritius  85:02  - 81:11
Mexico  pre-80  83:11  85:03  89  74; 89  92
Morocco  91  96
Nepal  89:08  89:10  86:05  89  -
New Zealand  85:02  83:08  pre-80; 84
Nigeria  87:07  90
30Pakistan  pre-80  92:03
Papua  New  80:07  86:01  pre-80
Guinea
Paraguay  90
Peru  91  93
Philippines  pre-80  84:06  82:12  81  81  94
Poland  90:01
Portugal  83:01  82:06  94
Romania  91:04
Sierra Leone  91:12  87:08
Singapore  pre-80  - 78  73
Southi  Africa  pre-80  - 80  84
Spain  84:01  83:01  87:03
Sri Lanka  85:09  88:03  80  78  -
Swaziland  82:12
Taiwan  89  -
Tanzania  91:07  93
Thailand  pre-80  90:03  90:03  89  mid-  92
80s
Togo  93
Trinidad  and  80:02  84:07;
Tobago  94:11
Turkey  80:07; 87:07  80-82; 84  80; 88  90
Uganda  92:03  81:10  88:07
Uruguay  79:09  pre-80
Venezuela  81:08; 89:02  89  91  -
Zaire  pre-80
Zambia  92
Zimbabwe  pre-80  92:04
Venezuela  81:08; 89:02  89  91  -
Zaire  pre-80
Zambia  92
Note: Other studies (based on expert assessments of administrative changes: Galbis (1983), Demirguic-
Kunt  and  Detragiache (19983),  Williamson and  Mahar  (1998) - start  of liberalization  and  'largely
liberalized' dates (see text).
31Figure 2:  Real Ex-post Wholesale Rates (IFS 60B)
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32Figure 3:  Real Ex-post Deposit Rates (IFS 60L)
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33Figure 4: Quoted Intermediation Spreads (IFS 60P-60L)
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34Figure 5:  Real Ex-ante Interest Rates
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35Figure 5:  Real Ex-ante Interest Rates  (contd.)
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XD~~~~~~  XObXz  SooInM>Data Appendix
The interest rates data used is from International Financial Statistics.  Five interest rate
categories are used: Official rates (60) represent rates at which the central banks lend to
financial institutions.  Money market rates (6013)  - representing interbank lending - and
treasury bill  rates  (60C)  are the  two  wholesale rates, while bank  deposit (60L)  and
lending (60P) rates are described as retail rates, though the data collected does typically
refer to rather large transactions. IFS  also contains some long-term government bond
interest rates which we have not examined in this paper.
Up to the mid-1970s interest rate data other than official rates was only available for a
handful of countries.  Country coverage of the iinterest  rate series in IFS improved rapidly
in  the late  1970s so that from  1980 on fairly comprehensive coverage  exists  for the
wholesale interest rates of over 50 countries, and the official and retail rates for over 70
countries.
For the monthly time  series analysis of  wholesale rates, we confined our analysis to
countries for which  complete or nearly 34 com-plete data was available over the period
1980-97.  Treasury bill rates (60C) are available for some 40 countries, of which  27
developing countries. 35 As it happens, 5 of these countries are all tiny members of the
East Caribbean Currency Board (ECCB), with a common interest rate and exchange rate
policy.  A further five have populations of under 0.5 million.  Therefore most of our
analysis concentrates on the remaining 17 larger developing countries, together with one
representative for the ECCB.  In addition we find a further 17 developing countries for
which substantially complete monthly data on imoney  market rates (60B) is available,  of
which seven share a comnmon  rate in the West African Monetary Union.  Excluding all
but one of the latter, this gives a total of 28 developing countries for which complete data
on the movements in wholesale rates can be analyzed.  These countries are: Argentina,
Brazil, Cote d'Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, India,
Sri Lanka, Mexico, Malawi, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
St. Lucia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,
South  Africa,  Zimbabwe.  Although  a  microstate,  St.  Lucia  is  included  as  a
representative  of the  ECCB. C6te d'Ivoire represents the UMOA.  The  following  12
industrial countries, for which monthly data on 60C exist, were included  as controls:
Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  Germany, Ireland,  Italy, New Zealand,  Portugal,  Spairn,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
For the expected or ex ante real interest rates, a Hodrick-Prescott filter with parameter
16500  was applied to the log-change in each coulmtry's  CPI, and the result subtracted frorn
the nominal exchange rate (cf. Edison, 199[6]).
3"  In a few cases short stretches  of missing  data were filled  by interpolating  available  quarterly  figures, or
by using  regression  relationships  with  available  data.
35 i.e. excluding those who were members of the OECD throughout.  In this definition Korea and Mexico
are included  with  the developing  countries,  as they were  not members  of the OECD  for most of the sample.
40For the econometric analysis using quarterly data on deposit and lending rates, similar
sample selection criteria were applied (substantially complete availability of the relevant
data over 1980-97; no mnicrostates,  only one country per currency union).  This left 37
developing countries for which more or less complete quarterly data on the movements in
bank rates can be analyzed. These countries are: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon,
Costa  Rica,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Cyprus,  Fiji,  the  Gambia,  Ghana,  Guatemala,  Guyana,
Honduras, Indonesia,  Jamaica,  Korea,  Malawi, Malta,  Mauritius,  Mexico,  Morocco,
Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, St. Lucia,  Sierra Leone, Singapore,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.  For  Ghana,  Mexico  and  Turkey,  deposit  rate  only  was  used.
Argentina and Brazil were excluded from the econometrics because of their outliers.  For
analysis requiring both wholesale and bank rates  (Table 5) the following countries also
had to  be  excluded  for want of  data: Botswana,  Cameroon, Costa  Rica,  Cyprus, the
Gambia, Guatemala, Honduras, Malta, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uruguay.  That left 21 countries
in the standard sample used.  Data for  19 industrial countries were used  as controls:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United
Kingdom, United States.
The shortcomings of the data must be acknowledged.  Long series like the ones we are
using necessarily involve changing definitions of the underlying assets, as institutions and
data-collection methods evolve.  Furthermore, there is typically a very wide  range of
interest  rates prevalent in  any financial market,  depending on  size, creditworthiness,
maturity and other asselt  characteristics. The limited number of series available here will
capture this diversity very imperfectly.
41Appendix 1:  Using economic theory to assess wholesale interest rate liberalization
Interest rates that are administratively controlled may differ both in their average level,
their  volatility  and in their correlation with mLovements  in market-determined interest
rates.  Analysis of these characteristics of interest rates can help characterize the extent
and nature of the interest rate controls.  It can also help distinguish between countries that
have biting controls, and those that do not.
Economic theory gives some pointers as to the likely influences on, and correlates of,
uncontrolled interest rates.  For example, if there is a stable demand for money function,
then interest rates will be correlated with the money stock and the other determinants of
money demand.  For instance, if the demand for money function is,
d
ml,  -p,  :a.  +a,i,  +a2y,  + a3(m,l  -p,)+  u,t,
then the money market equilibrium condition can be  solved  for the  interest rate  i to
obtain:
it =i°  --[m  - a 3m,.l - (1  - a3 )p, - a. - a2y,  - u,.  2
a,
A  stable demand for  money should mean that the parameters a, are constant over  a
relevant period and a moderate variance of the disturbance u.  More complicated money
demand specifications may be required (including different dynamic specifications), but
the  general  idea  of  a  stable  relationship between  the  interest  rate,  money  and  the
determinants of its demand remain.  Note that these relationships should hold if domestic
money markets are uncontrolled; they do not require liberalization of the external capital
account.
Another theory-derived relationship for market-determined interest  rates is  uncovered
interest parity (UIP).  This relates domestic to foreign interest rates by the expected rate
of exchange rate change plus a possible risk premium:
it = i  -=  i,1+ E,  s,+ - s, +,  3
Evidently (3) can only be expected to prevail if there are no effective exchange controls.
The two equations (2) and (3) thus define two shadow interest rates: i* being the interest
rate that would prevail under UIP, and iO being the rate consistent with internal money
equilibrium.
The volatility of the two shadow rates depends on the volatility of the determinants and
their mutual correlation.  If short-run output changes and stochastic shocks to the money
demand equation are small, or are negatively correlated with change in the real money
stock (accommodating monetary policy), then the variance of the change in i°  will be
relatively low.  If expected exchange rate change and the risk premium  demanded b,y
speculators are volatile and mutually uncorrelated, then i* will be relatively volatile.  This
plausible ranking is used in approach (b) of the text to dating liberalization of wholesale
rates.
42Of course, the two shadow rate equations are not incompatible.  Some or all of the other
variables shown may be endogenous.  If both UIP and domestic monetary equilibrium
(with the money demand function adopted) prevail, then the two shadow interest rates
will be equal.  Thus, for example, in a fixed exchange rate regime, the money stock may
adjust to ensure that the money market equilibrium condition (2) prevails, with i,° = i,+.
Previous literature: majcor  contributions to measuring liberalization
Two main approaches in the literature draw on this equilibrium framework to assess the
degree of capital account openness. The first, due to Edwards (1985) and Edwards and
Khan (1985), defines an open capital accounts as one which satistfies UIP. This approach
nests  the  UIP  in  a  broader  maintained  hypothesis  encompassing both  the  domestic
monetary  equilibrium  and  UIP  conditions  as  special  cases.  For  example,  we  can
estimate 36 the parameter (p  in a regression defined by:
it = (p i,  + Q - )i,°+  ,  (4  )
The value (o = 1 is interpreted as complete capital mobility, q = 0 as a closed financial
system.
The Edwards-Khan approach requires the use of data on interest rates.  However, such
data  may not be available, at least for some of the relevant domestic financial markets.
For example, published official interest rates may be applicable only to  a  fraction  of
borrowings and allocate(d  by administrative directive.  If there is a parallel market, then
the unobserved interest rate on that market may give a better indication of the degree to
which the financial system is integrated in the World economy.  In order to deal with the
unobserved interest rate issue, Haque and Montiel (1991) proposed a way of solving for
the unobserved shadow interest rate that would prevail in the absence of capital mobility.
In contrast to Edwards and Khan, who use the shadow rate i° defined as the rate that
clears the money market  for the observed money stock,  Haque  and Mcntiel  use  the
concept of the hypothetical money stock m" that would prevail if there were no capital
flows.  They then define a new shadow rate i' as the rate that would clear the money
market for the hypothetical money stock.  Specifically, let mt in equation (2) be replaced
with m'  defined by:
m,'  = ml + kP + v,  m,+v,  (5)
where kP is the net private capital flow, and vt is a measurement error.  The new shadow
interest rate is then defined by:
i, ~-  a[m'  - a3m,  - (-a 3 )p, - ao  - a2y,  - u]  (2')
a,
The true (but unobserved) interest rate it is now hypothesized to be a weighted average of
the UIP and the hypothetical closed-market shadow interest rate i' giving:
3  Provided  we have  some  empirical  substitute  for  the unobserved  exchange  rate  expectation.
43i,  = Vi,++  (4')
The money market equilibrium condition, evaluated at this (unobserved) interest rate tt,
then provides the regression equation to be estimated:
mt -Ap  =70  +f 1 i,  +7r 2yt  +,T3(m,,  - pA)+  4 (m'  -p,)+  W  (5)
where the parameters 7ri  satisfy 7ri  = aijp for i=1,2,3;  7r4=1-  (, and the disturbance wt is:
W,  =Ut-U,  -±  4V,w  +  ,*  (6)
The estimate of 7r 4 is the key parameter here, as a value insignificantly different from zero
corresponds to  an estimate of ,  insignificantly different from unity, and thus to  non-
rejection of the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility.
WhWile  both  EK and  HM models estimate a constant parameter ,p, it would easily  be
possible to adapt their approach to allow some time variation in p , and hence in principle
to estimate the timing of liberalization.
Difficulties
(i)  Recasting  the  Edwards-Khan  approach  to  recognize that  UIP  and  monetary
equilibrium are not incompatible:
These two approaches present some issues of irnterpretation. To begin with the Edwards
and  Khan  approach,  there  is  the  problem  of  interpreting  values  of  v  that  are
insignificantly different from both zero and unity.  A point estimate of ?  lying between
zero and one at first sight appears to imply a regime partially reflecting convergence to
domestic money-market equilibrium, 37 and partly to UIP.  But, as already noted, there is
x10  logical incompatibility between these two hypotheses. Under the joint hypothesis h' 1
of perfect capital mobility and money market equilibrium, if both  i;  and  i°  are knowrn
they will be equal and hence perfectly correlated. Even recognizing that neither is known
exactly, multicollinearity can be expected in the estimating equation if UIP truly prevails,
preventing significant coefficients.  Besides, under HI either of the proxies could be as
good as the other for either of it and  i, 0 . In short, to find p significantly different fromn
zero is not consistent with H,, and it is not enitirely  clear how such a finding is to  be
interpreted. We return to some ways out of this difficulty in (v) below.
(ii) Does the Haque-Montiel approach simply add measurement error to an identity?
The Haque and Montiel approach adds some additional difficulties of its own.  First is the
definition of m'  . Simply subtracting actual private capital flows from  the observed
money stock  certainly does not provide a  reliable estimate of what  the money stock
would be if capital were totally restricted.  Public capital flows and the current account
are also likely to be  endogenous. The measurement error v is likely to  be significant,
biasing the estimate of  p towards unity.  More generally, one may be allowed to  be
skeptical of a hypothesis test that depends on the value of the coefficient of a variable that
has been constructed by adding a novel variable to the dependent variable.
3  Recall  that  the 'equilibrium'  of equation  (1) has a lagged  adjustment  built-in.
44Indeed, inspection of Haque and Montiel's 15 country regressions reveal that only three of
the countries have estirmated money demand functions with  a significant interest  rate
variable. The estimated equations are consistent with what one would expect if kP, i* and
y were just uncorrelated noise, and the postulated monetary equilibrium and UIP were not
true.  In effect, what is  being estimated is a noisy identity.  In particular note that for
India, where kP has low variance, the estimated coefficient 7r 4 is insignificantly different
from unity, and all the other variables insignificantly different from zero.
(iii)  What does the variable m' measure?
One may also question the theoretical basis for constructing the weighted average interest
rate using  (2'), based oIn money market equilibrium computed  at hypothetical  money
stlock m'  instead of (2), based on the actual money stock mt.  For suppose that 0  = 0 is
true.  Then the HM model asserts that (2') prevails.  But the actual money stock is m, not
n,'.  So the postulated relationship (2') actually implies monetary disequilibrium (since in
general  m,"  mi,).  As such, the KM model is  not consistent with  domestic money-
market equilibrium.
Nlote  that, if we try to modify HM's approach by simply substituting (2) for (2') we cannot
proceed to recover the parameter q  , which is no longer identified in the new estimating
e,quation (5'):
mt - p,  =ao 0 +  aii  +a2y,  +±a 3(m,l  - pI)+w,  (5')
The only leverage one has here is that (5') is derived under the condition ( # 0.  A finding
that the  coefficient of i*  in (5')  was non-zero would thus be  a  test against complete
closure of the capital market.
(iv) UIP doesn't fit well for most countries
Finally  there  is a  broacder problem  with  both  of  these approaches,  and  that  is  that,
although well-founded theoretically, UIP and a stable money demand function are both
conditions for which there is comparatively little empirical support even for industrial
countries with  open cariital accounts.  Indeed, UIP  is  generally rejected  in  empirical
studies. 38 Demand for money functions often shift, and need to be quite complex to have
a  chance  of  remaining  stable  over  lengthy  periods.  Therefore,  however  solid  the
theoretical basis of these tests for capital integration, they rest on rather flimsy empirical
underpinnings.
There are possible explanations which allow us to believe in UIP even though  it fails
most  stringent  tests.  McCallum  (1994)  proposes that  if  UIP  is  augmented  with  a
disturbance termn,  and if that error should be correlated with the interest differential (as it
would if policymakers responded to the disturbance by liquidity policy) then one would
observe failure of the usual UIP tests.  Kaminsky (1993) suggests that UIP fails in small
" Though it may pass weak tests, such as stationarity and non-zero mean of deviations from UIP (Tanner,
1998).
45samples because of a peso problem: agents are not sure which regime they are in  and
hedge their behavior in a way that becomes a systematic forecasting error over intervals
of  several  quarters or  more.  Mishkin  (1992)  observes  that  the  Fisher  equation  (a
domestic economy equivalent of interest parity) is more closely satisfied in periods of
rapid inflation. This might also be relevant for UIP.
(v)  Decomposition of UIP deviations
The underlying idea behind the Edwards-Khan approach is to try to detect the extent to
which domestic factors cause a deviation from UIP.  The issue we have identified in (ii)
above  is  that  EK's  regressions  imply  that  any  correlation between  interest  rate  and
domestic variables is seen as a deviation from l:JIP even though some of such correlations
are consistent with UIP.
A. -theoretically more  robust  way  of  drawing  inferences  from  correlations  between
domestic variables and interest rates (within a UIP  context) is to recognize that  such
correlations can exist, but must enter through the interest parity condition. Specifically, if
we assume that a linear combination of domestic variables Xt observed at time t, helps
forecast future exchange rates, and that rational expectations prevails, then we can write:
s,+,  - s, = Xi ,B + u,  (7)
wahere  u is uncorrelated with Xt.  Now if UIF' prevails, we can take expectations in (7)
and substitute into (3) to obtain:
i,  =i,  if  +  -t,,  +  (3)
Now (3') and (7) can be jointly estimated and the restriction of equality of the parameteirs
,B  in each can be tested. That should provide a rnore robust test of the open capital market
hypothesis.  However, for this we do (of course) require the maintained hypothesis that
the risk premium 4t  is also uncorrelated with Xi,.
(We did  implement the above approach for both industrial and  developing  countries.
Writing  the forecast of exchange rate change (r±t+I  - st) from (7) as  zt  we estimated the
equation:
i, = a(if  + z,)  + X,,8'+,
and  found that  ,'  is always significantly different from zero.  Interestingly, a  , which
could be thought of as an index of the degree to which UIP prevails, is insignificant for
pre-liberalization periods in the developing countries, but  estimated at 0.37 (with  a t-
statistic of  10.5) for post-liberalization periodLs. Note, however, that a  is estimated as
insignificant for industrial countries, recalling the empirical weakness of UIP for those
countries.)
Several  recent  papers  employ  an  equation  similar  to  (7)  to  probe  the  correlates  of
deviations  from  UIP.  One  useful  and  popular  approach  involves  decomposition
deviations from UIP (forward bias) into changes in real exchange rates and real interest
differentials.  Levine (1991) provides evidence to show that anticipated real exchange rate
46changes pass through tc UIP deviations one-for-one and that these (rather than deviations
in expected real interest rates) are the primary component of the forward bias (for five
industrial countries).  Ihis  conclusion meshes well with the well-known fact (for these
countries) that  short-run nominal  exchange rate changes are much more volatile than
nominal interest or inflation rates: thus short-run fluctuations in real exchange rates are
dominated by nominal exchange rate changes.
Tanner (1998) applies a similar decomposition to a larger sample, including developing
countries, but  assesses the relative importance of the different components mainly by
comparing the  size their  variances.  His finding that  real interest  rate  variations  are
relatively important in cleveloping  countries is thus chiefly a reflection of that importance
of inflation fluctuations in many of the developing countries that are in his sample.
The findings of Levine and Tanner are not incompatible.  With his regression approach,
Levine is essentially stating that it is only to the extent that real exchange rate changes
can be forecast that UII' deviations can be forecast: in explaining UIP deviations it does
not help to add variables additional to the forecast real exchange rate change.  Tanner's
result is not concerned with forecastibility: he merely ranks the contribution of variances
and  covariances.  His point that real  interest rates are highly variable in  developing
countries does not imply that their changes are forecastible.  (Though they are, as we
show in the text).
In fact, applying Levine's general approach to our developing country data, we find that
the best forecast of real exchange rate change (linear projection on available macro data)
does help forecast UIF' deviations, but  that it can be improved upon  by the  separate
inclusion of some of the other explanatory macro variables.
(vi)  Alternatives to IJIP
Other equilibrium relationships could conceivably be used in lieu of UIP as a benchmark
for testing for liberalization of wholesale rates. Among possible candidates might be the
theory of correlation between deviations from purchasing-power parity and real interest
differentials, at least at business cycle frequencies (Baxter, 1994, Levine, 1992; but see
Edison and Pauls, 1993).39 However, it is probably fair to say that these are not much
more empirically robust than UIP.
More generally one can model the response of interest rates to inflation (Fisher effect),
exchange rate change and foreign real rates.  Relevant here is the hypothesis of constant
expected real interest rate differentials (cf. Cumby and Obstfeld,  1984, Levine,  1991).
The speed of convergence of real interest rates towards a world norm can be measured
(Faruqee, 1991, Cavaglia,  1992, cf. O'Connell,  1998).  A version of this  approach  is
presented in the paper.
(vii)  Statistical multi-factor models
3  Could  also compare  other  models  of interest  rate determination  (e.g.  Orr, Edey  and Kennedy,  1995).
47Since there are so many unobserved variables and the theoretical determination of interest
rates is so complex, it may be useful to approach the question of modeling the entire set
of world interest rates as being determined by a small number of unobserved common
factors plus idiosyncratic local factors.  This approach has been employed, for example,
by Koedijk and Kool (1994), in order to analyze European interest rates, and the method
is  potentially  even  more  effective  when  data. on  a  larger  number  of  countries  is
available. 40 It can allow both identification of a core world interest rate for comparative
purposes  (measure  mean  deviation  in  real  rates),  and  also  allow  the  experience  of
different developing countries to be grouped.  The interesting issues include:  (a) How
many significant common factors are there in real interest rates across the world?  (b)
What are the characteristics of countries have low correlations with the main common
factors?  In particular, what is the role of financial repression; and of national inflation
vol]atility  in determining low correlations.
In practice, we find that on the larger samnple  of 24 developing country wholesale rates4'
the  picture  that  emerges  is  of  a  diverse and  volatile  interest  rate  experience,  with
conisiderable persistence  in  real  interest  rate rnovements.  The  degree to  which  the
movements are common across countries was assessed by computing the eigenvalues and
principal components of the real interest rate data.  With the first principal component
accounting for only some 28 per cent of the total variance it is clear that the degree of
commnonality  is rather modest.  Indeed, a three-factor model explains only 61 per cent of
the total variance, and a six factor model is required to reach 80 per cent).  With such
modest explanatory power, it is not  surprising that no evident economic interpretation
could be  placed  on  these principal  components, nor are  they highly  correlated  with
inclustrial  country interest rates.
A itechnical  difficulty that emerges in using factor models is that high volatility countries
tend to dominate the overall variability to be exp:lained,  and a natural normalization of the
dala that would reduce this dependency on outliers is not obviously available.
40 The model  of unobserved  common  factors  has also been applied  to the term structure  of interest  rates in
one country;  see for example,  Jegadeesh  and Pennacchi  (1996).
41 This  is the monthly  sample  (excluding  Argentina  and BTazil)  discussed  in the text.
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